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ABSTRACT
There is an emerging consensus that women’s participation in
peace negotiations contributes to the quality and durability of
peace after civil war. However, to date, this proposition has
remained empirically untested. Moreover, how women’s parti-
cipation may contribute to durable peace has not been system-
atically explored. This article uses a mixed method design to
examine this proposition. Our statistical analysis demonstrates a
robust correlation between peace agreements signed by female
delegates and durable peace. We further find that agreements
signed by women show a significantly higher number of peace
agreement provisions aimed at political reform, and higher
implementation rates for provisions. We argue that linkages
between women signatories and women civil society groups
explain the observed positive impact of women’s direct partici-
pation in peace negotiations. Collaboration and knowledge
building among diverse women groups contributes to better
content of peace agreements and higher implementation rates
of agreement provisions. We substantiate this argument with
qualitative case study evidence and demonstrate how colla-
boration between female delegates and women civil society
groups positively impacts peace processes. Our findings support
the assumption that women’s participation in peace negotia-
tions increases the durability and the quality of peace.
KEYWORDS
Conflict; durable peace;
gender; peace negotiations;
women
More than 15 years after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution
1325, which called for strengthening women and girls’ protection from
conflict-related sexual violence and women’s equal participation in all stages
of the prevention and resolution of conflict, women’s participation in peace
negotiations with voice and influence remains exceptional rather than the
norm. The international community increasingly acknowledges this partici-
pation gap and the lack of systematic and in-depth research (UN 2015).
Addressing this gap is important because peace negotiations can be a window
of opportunity for increasing women’s political participation in a postconflict
country (Anderson 2016). For example, postconflict African countries enjoy
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considerably higher rates of female legislative representation and a faster
trajectory of adopting women’s rights reforms in comparison to non-post-
conflict countries on the continent because women groups seized the oppor-
tunity for political reform (Tripp 2015). Durable peace is generally more
likely in countries with higher levels of gender equality that allow for
women’s political participation (Gizelis 2009).
This article focuses on peace negotiations and the participation of “local”
women who represent either a conflict party or civil society. Does women’s
participation in peace negotiations have a positive impact on the quality and
the durability of peace, independent of international peacekeeping, the par-
ticipation of civil society actors, and other factors related to gender equality?
To date, we lack empirical analysis that shows that women’s direct participa-
tion positively impacts the durability as well as the quality of peace after civil
war. Furthermore, there are competing theoretical explanations as to why
and how women’s participation positively impacts peace durability. Case
study research has focused on women’s participation as civil society activists
who pressure warring parties to conclude an agreement, and as delegates who
set agendas that often prioritize women’s rights and broader issues related to
the quality of peace. Some policy documents remain unhelpfully rooted in
essentialist assumptions about women’s inherently peaceful nature to explain
their assumed positive influence on peace processes. However, such assump-
tions cloud our understanding of the mechanisms that causally link women’s
participation to durable peace. To date, one comparative study indicates that
women’s participation in peace processes contributes both to the likelihood
of reaching a peace agreement and to its successful implementation (O’Reilly
et al. 2015). We also know that women’s security and the socioeconomic and
political status of women directly impact the likelihood of (renewed) civil war
(Caprioli 2005; Hudson et al. 2012, 2009; Melander 2005). Based on these
findings, we test whether women’s meaningful participation in peace nego-
tiations positively impacts the quality and the durability of peace.
We apply a mixed method design, or nested analysis (Lieberman 2005).
First, we statistically test the impact of women’s participation in peace
negotiations on the durability of peace and find a robust correlation.
Second, we analyze descriptive statistics of peace accord content and imple-
mentation rates and find that agreements with women signatories show
better accord quality and higher implementation rates. Third, we provide
brief case studies that trace the mechanism of linkages between women
signatories and women civil society groups to explain the observed positive
impact of women’s participation on both quality and durability of peace.
For our statistical analysis, we coded all peace agreements that are
included in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) data set for female
signatories. We do not argue that women who participate in peace negotia-
tions automatically change negotiation dynamics or the peace process.
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Oftentimes, women members of negotiation teams may not participate with a
voice or may be excluded from important backroom negotiations. However,
women and women groups who signed peace agreements can be assumed to
have directly participated in negotiations, with voice and influence. We find
that women signatories include a diverse range of political actors: female
members of armed groups, female government representatives, and female
delegates from civil society groups. Our findings indicate that between 1990
and 2014, out of 130 peace agreements, women signed only 13. Contrary to
common expectations, our data show that the number of women who signed
peace agreements has not increased since UNSCR 1325 has been adopted in
2000. Despite the modest number of peace agreements signed by women, our
statistical analysis indicates a robust relationship between women signatories
and the durability of peace. Furthermore, we also find that peace agreements
signed by women include a higher number of agreement provisions and a
higher rate of provision implementation 10 years after the agreement com-
pared to those not signed by women. Thus, we conclude that women’s
participation in negotiations positively impacts the quality and the durability
of peace.
Why does the presence of female signatories among conflict parties posi-
tively impact the quality and the durability of peace? We argue that linkages
between women civil society groups and female signatories positively impact
accord content and implementation. Both quality of accord content and
provisions’ implementation rate contribute to a longer lasting peace (Joshi
and Quinn 2015, 2017). Collaboration between female delegates and women
civil society groups is important because civil society is gendered and the
general participation of civil society groups does not automatically imply that
women groups receive access to influence the negotiations. For example, in
Guatemala (1991–1995), Luz Mendez, the only female member of the rebel
Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) delegation and a
signatory to several agreements of the peace process, collaborated with
women civil society groups that did not have direct access to the negotia-
tions. This linkage contributed to unprecedented commitments to gender
equality in the peace accords and resulted in crucial networks between a
diverse range of women activists, which supported provision implementation
with regard to women’s security and their political, social, and economic
rights. We use qualitative case study evidence to demonstrate the existence of
these linkages in peace processes with women signatories.
This article proceeds as follows: We first examine the literature on peace
agreements and durability of peace and find that peace accord quality and
implementation rate emerges as the strongest predictor for durable peace.
We then review research on women’s participation in peace negotiations and
the gender equality and peace hypothesis. Based on this, we present two
hypotheses: Women’s direct participation in peace negotiations, that is
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female signatories, positively impacts (1) the durability and (2) the quality of
peace. Second, we develop a theory to explain why women’s participation in
negotiations contributes to the durability and the quality of peace. We argue
that linkages between female signatories and women civil society groups
contribute to the quality and content of a peace accord and to its implemen-
tation. Third, we discuss our research design and data and test our first
hypothesis using a Cox model for duration analysis. We find a robust
statistical relationship between women signatories and the durability of
peace. The small number of peace agreements signed by women delegates
does not allow us to test for selection bias with advanced statistical means.
We therefore discuss the possibility of selection bias descriptively and draw
on a qualitative comparison of the key characteristics of peace agreements
with women signatories. Fourth, we examine our second hypothesis and
analyze descriptive statistics of peace accord provisions and implementation
for agreements with and without female signatories, drawing on data from
the Peace Accord Matrix (PAM) data set. Fifth, we provide brief case study
evidence of linkages between female signatories and women civil society
groups. We discuss these linkages in more detail for the well-documented
case of Liberia, a country that has made remarkable progress in the imple-
mentation of women’s rights and political representation after the war.
In sum, our findings support the argument that women’s direct participa-
tion in peace negotiations with voice increases the quality and durability of
peace. While further research is needed into the emergence and transforma-
tion of women networks during peace processes, and on the impact of civil
society more broadly, our analysis has important implications for research
and policy practice.
Peace Agreements and the Durability of Peace
Looking at previous research on durable peace after civil war, studies have
identified a broad range of factors that impact the durability of peace (Doyle
and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2004; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothschild 2001; Hartzell
and Hoddie 2003; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Nilsson 2012; Walter 2004). First,
Page Fortna (2008) showed that peace lasts significantly longer when international
personnel are deployed and that peacekeepers tend to go to the most difficult
places. Scholars further argued that power-sharing provisions in negotiated set-
tlements positively impact durable peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003), especially
when parties engage in costly concessions by implementingmilitary and territorial
provisions on power sharing (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008).
Second, the inclusion of civil society representatives has been found to
improve the legitimacy of the agreements reached and, thus, to increase
chances for a lasting end to war (Belloni 2008; Jarstad and Sisk 2008;
Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St John and Kew 2008). Civil society participation
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increases public representation and brings local, context-sensitive knowledge
to the table, which supports implementing accord provisions at the local level
(Prendergast and Plumb 2002). Direct civil society participation is particu-
larly significant in undemocratic conflict contexts and engineers ownership
of the peace agreement, which is vital for political and democratic develop-
ment (Prendergast and Plumb 2002; Wanis St-John and Kew 2008). Civil
society inclusion may also send a strong signal to warring parties that there is
very limited societal support for continued violence, which could mitigate
commitment problems (Nilsson 2012: 250).
Third, recent research has demonstrated that peace accord content and
implementation of accord provisions emerge as the strongest predictors for
durable peace. Negotiations allow civil war actors to achieve broad-based
reforms of policy and government (Joshi and Quinn 2015). An agreement
with few provisions leaves most government sectors unaffected and is thus
unlikely to motivate conflict parties, particularly the broader rebel constitu-
ency, to disarm, demobilize, and commit to agreement implementation.
Research further suggests that a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA),
which represents the culmination of all previous negotiations and agreed-
upon terms, can make securing peace more likely (Joshi et al. 2015). Apart
from the number and scope of peace agreement provisions, the extent to
which provisions are implemented emerges as the strongest predictor of
peace durability (Joshi and Quinn 2017).
In sum, peace processes with broad societal support, agreements with a
high number of provisions that represent a sociopolitical reform agenda, and
high implementation rates for agreement provisions during the postconflict
period most likely result in durable peace.
Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations and Durable Peace
Statistical research on women’s participation and durable peace is limited to
date. Caprioli, Nielsen, and Hudson (2010) examined several cases and
provided preliminary evidence that postconflict peace is more durable
when women participate directly in negotiations. Laurel Stone’s (2014) logis-
tic regression analysis of the impact of women’s participation in peace
processes and durable peace found both a positive and a negative impact.
She coded peace agreement documents for women’s inclusion in the agree-
ment agenda, and women’s participation as negotiator, mediator, witness, or
signatory. Her findings were mixed, indicating “limited significance in gen-
eral,” but a “predicted probability (. . .) that increasing women’s participation
could increase the probability of violence ending within one year by 24.9
percent” (Stone 2014: 28). By contrast, we use survival analysis for a more
accurate analysis of peace durability and only focus on the impact of women
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signatories to exclude measuring the impact of women delegates who may
not have been able to meaningfully participate in negotiations.
Research on gender inequality and armed conflict, and on women’s poli-
tical participation after war, found a strong link between the political inclu-
sion of women and the durability of peace. Gender inequality is a strong
predictor of armed conflict, which suggests that there is a connection
between women’s security, the political participation of women, and durable
peace. Gender equality has been shown to be a strong indicator of a state’s
peacefulness (Hudson et al. 2012, 2009) and gender inequality a strong
predictor of civil war onset (Caprioli 2005; Melander 2005). In societies
where women do comparatively better, prospects for successful peacebuild-
ing operations increase because women can express a voice in the peace-
making process and elicit broader domestic participation (Gizelis 2009). A
higher proportion of female representatives in the national legislature pro-
longs peace after a ceasefire or negotiated settlement (Shair-Rosenfield and
Wood 2017).
Based on this research, we test the following two hypotheses:
H1: Women’s direct participation in peace negotiations—measured as female
signatories—increases the durability of peace.
H2: Women’s direct participation in peace negotiations—measured as female
signatories—increases the quality of peace.
Linkages: Peace Processes, Women Negotiators, and Women Civil
Society Groups
Why would the presence of female signatories increase the quality and the
durability of peace? We argue that linkages between women signatories and
women civil society groups improve accord content and implementation of
accord provisions. Linkages between female signatories and women civil
society groups result in more accord provisions aimed at sociopolitical
change and greater provision implementation rates due to sustained advo-
cacy by well-informed women groups, thus making durable peace more
likely.
Feminist researchers have long argued that the end of armed conflict does
not automatically translate into improved security for women and that a
meaningful peace must take women’s protection and women’s rights into
account (Chinkin 2003; Meintjes, Pillay and Turshen 2001; Pankhurst 2003,
2008). Apart from rights-based arguments for women’s inclusion, scholars
have emphasized women’s social knowledge, conflict expertise, grassroots
networks, perceptions of femininity, and experiences during war (Anderlini
2007; Cockburn 2007; El-Bushra 2007; Kaufman and Williams 2010; Krause
and Enloe 2015). However, it remains unclear if perceptions of femininity
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and community-level conflict management skills translate directly into a
positive impact on state-level peace negotiations. Furthermore, women are
not a homogenous group. Female delegates from different backgrounds may
hold very different understandings of peace and pursue distinct priorities and
agendas. There are also important distinctions to be made in how women
enter the peace process and negotiate their goals, and what women networks
emerge and endure (Chang et al. 2015).
Our argument proceeds from the diversity of women groups. Women’s parti-
cipation as signatories allows them to establish and strengthen linkages to women
civil society groups with strong connections to the grassroots level. Conflict zones
contain many movements, initiatives, and networks built by women to address
not only humanitarian and practical but also political issues (Chinkin 2003: 10).
Women civil society groups often build on the transformation in gender relations,
which are particularly severe after long civil wars. Women signatories can become
brokers who connect local-level women civil society networks to track-one nego-
tiations. Brokers are individuals who bridge gaps in social structures and facilitate
the flow of goods, information, or knowledge across that gap (Burt 2005; Stovel
and Shaw 2012: 140). They connect actors across systems of social, economic, or
political relations (Stovel, Golub, andMilgrom 2011). Although they often rely on
informal and personal relationships, their actions can have significant macro-level
consequences because network reconfigurations alter processes of social integra-
tion (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 140).
Linkages between women with access to the negotiations and a diverse set of
women civil society groups not only broaden societal support for the peace
process. They also inform the negotiations on specific issues and agendas that
can lead to the inclusion of provisions for shaping sociopolitical reform. Beyond
the immediate end of armed hostilities, peace negotiations lay the groundwork
for the postconflict political, economic, and social order. Groups excluded from
negotiations often remain marginalized in postconflict politics. As a result,
provisions for women’s rights and gender equality, and other issues relating to
socioeconomic reform, are largely absent from peace agreement texts (Bell and
O’Rouke 2010: 954; Ellerby 2015: 186). Female delegates may initially not be
aware of gender issues but can become partners for women civil society activists
if connections are carefully built and maintained. As delegates who can directly
influence negotiations, they are in amuch stronger position to push for women’s
rights and provisions that overall improve women’s socioeconomic position
than women groups who are relegated to observer status. At the same time,
pressure from women civil society groups at the fringe of negotiations can
strengthen the position of women delegates. Women delegates can support
advocacy by providing women civil society groups with information about the
negotiation process so that they can effectively mobilize and create momentum.
Beyond the inclusion of specific provisions in peace agreements, women
networks, collaboration, and knowledge building during peace negotiations
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also result in strong networks that can advocate for the implementation of
provisions during the postconflict period, which is vital for a successful peace
process. Peace negotiations are embedded within a broader peace process
that can span years with distinct negotiation stages. Agreements can consist
of different types of documents: pre-negotiation agreements, framework/
substantive agreements, and implementation/renegotiation agreements (Bell
2006: 376). In some peace processes, issues are negotiated in several separate
agreements and are then brought together or ratified by a comprehensive
final agreement. Implementation agreements often follow peace agreements
and involve new negotiations and renegotiations, in part because parties to
the process “test whether they can claw back concessions made at an earlier
stage” (Bell 2006: 378). Strong and well-informed women networks are
crucial for the inclusion of agreement provisions that redress inequality
and sociopolitical structures, and for advocacy during the postconflict law-
making and implementation period to hold all stakeholders to account.
Our argument extends previous research on the positive impact of civil
society inclusion in negotiations. It is important to take the gendered nature
of civil society and political activism into account because it can put women
groups at a disadvantage. Men tend to hold the majority of leading positions in
civil society organizations. Women’s activism depends on their socioeconomic
position, particularly the structural conditions of family relations, income gen-
eration, and access to state institutions (Paffenholz 2015: 2). Thus, even when
peace negotiations allow for the consultation of civil society groups or offer civil
society groups a seat at the table, such gender-unspecific mechanisms of parti-
cipation do not automatically ensure that local women groups are heard and
their demands incorporated into agreements and political decision making.
Certainly, male delegates can also collaborate with women civil society groups,
but women delegates tend to be the primary brokers for women networks.
In sum, if women cannot participate in negotiations with a voice and
influence, important networks between negotiators and women civil society
groups are unlikely to be established or remain weak. The lack of women’s
direct participation reduces chances that provisions aimed at gender equality
and socioeconomic development are included in the peace agreement and
that they are implemented in the years after the peace agreement. Thus,
women’s exclusion from negotiations perpetuates their political marginaliza-
tion, reduces chances for political reform and for the implementation of the
peace agreement, thus undermining the durability of peace.
Research Design
Our empirical strategy combines quantitative and qualitative analysis in a
three-step process. We first test whether we find a statistically significant
relationship between women’s direct participation in negotiations and the
992 J. KRAUSE ET AL.
durability of peace. Second, based on our findings, we analyze descriptive
statistics of accord content and implementation rates to examine whether
peace agreements with women signatories resulted in a better quality of peace
and higher implementation rates. Better accord content and higher imple-
mentation rates not only improve the quality of a peace accord but also the
likelihood of durable peace. Lastly, we use qualitative case study evidence to
demonstrate that in all peace processes with female signatories, linkages to
women civil society groups were built.
Women’s participation in peace processes can take various forms, includ-
ing direct participation as delegates and indirect participation as observers,
consultants, or witnesses. Women’s roles and influence in indirect forms of
participation and as delegates without signature can vary significantly from
case to case. We use a narrow approach and only code female signatories to
peace agreements in order to measure women’s meaningful participation as
best as possible. Furthermore, we exclude women signatories who represent
international third parties from our analysis because our proposed mechan-
ism for explaining women’s positive impact on peace durability is based on
the inclusion of country-level women networks and their political participa-
tion, and not on the mere presence of women.
Data
We employ data from the UCDP, which provides information on 216 peace
agreements from 1975 until 2011. Unless otherwise stated, all data used in
this article come from the UCDP (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom, Högbladh,
and Wallensteen 2006; Högbladh 2011; Pettersson and Eck 2018). Many
peace processes include several subsequent agreements, and some are
designed to address specific issues. The UCDP peace agreement data set
includes full, partial, and process agreements. Since process agreements
only deal with regulating the peace negotiations without directly affecting
the actual peace agreements, we only include full and partial peace agree-
ments in our analysis. Furthermore, if a peace process included several partial
peace agreements before a durable agreement was reached, we censored these
partial agreements. Several full peace agreements signed by female delegates
belong to peace processes that included partial peace agreements that women
also signed. Hence, we excluded all durable partial peace agreements followed
by a durable final agreement from our analysis in order not to overestimate
the effect of women’s participation. If women signed one or more partial
agreements but not the full peace agreement of the same peace process, we
still coded the full peace agreement as signed by a woman and excluded the
partial agreements from the analysis.
Since the end of the Cold War, peace processes and postconflict peace
building have been oriented around the notion of the “liberal peace,” with a
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focus on democracy, free-market economies, and the protection of human
rights (Barnett 2006; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2009).
Many more UN peacekeeping missions were deployed and peacekeeping
evolved as a tool to maintain peace after civil war (Fortna and Howard 2008:
284). Given this significant change in the international environment, we focus
only on peace agreements concluded from 1989.1 Given the prevalence of civil
wars since 1990s, our data set only includes peace agreements that followed
intra-state conflicts. All in all, after excluding censored partial peace agree-
ments and peace agreements not resulting from civil wars, our database
consists of 82 peace agreements in 42 armed conflicts between 1989 and 2011.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is durability of peace measured in days without
armed conflict from the signing of the peace agreement to the beginning of
renewed fighting.2 The variable durability of peace takes into account the
behavior of the signatory parties and other armed groups within the same
conflict who may not have signed the peace accord.3 In the case of a durable
peace agreement, the number of days until the end of the year 2011 (the end
of the observation period) was counted.
Independent Variable
Our independent variable of interest is women signatories to peace agree-
ments. This variable includes female government or rebel group representa-
tives and civil society representatives but excludes third-party representatives.
The UCDP data set only lists the signatories of a peace agreement but did not
code their sex. This information was also not available from other data sets,
such as the Transitional Justice Institute Peace Agreement Database and the
UN Peacemaker Peace Agreements Database. We cross-checked signatories’
names recorded in the UCDP peace agreement database with information
from the UN Peacemaker database to verify and code female delegates’
signatures to peace agreements.
Our data set includes a total of only 13 peace agreements with women
signatories in 6 peace processes: the DR Congo (2003), El Salvador (1992),
Guatemala (1996), Liberia (2003), Papua New Guinea (2001), and the UK/
Northern Ireland (1998).
1Three of the pre-1989 agreements excluded concern Chad, and we could not verify whether or not women signed
the agreement. The remaining five agreements concern Uganda (1985; 1988), Sudan (1988), The Philippines/
Mindanao (1976), and India/Tripura (1988), all of which lacked women signatories.
2Note that all peace agreements are observed as of the 12 months following the peace agreement.
3Note that this concerns only armed groups who are active in the same incompatibility, and not actors in other
conflicts within the same country.
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As a first inspection, a log rank test indicates a significant difference in
survival times between peace agreements with and without female signa-
tories. This finding supports our hypothesis that women’s participation in
peace negotiations increases the durability of peace.4
Control Variables
Our control variables are divided into three groups. The first group consists of
factors relating to the armed conflict: conflict duration, intensity of conflict, the
number of warring parties, and conflict issue. All of these variables have been found
to affect the durability of peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2003; Hartzell
and Hoddie 2003; Walter 2004). The variable conflict duration counts the number
of years since the beginning of the armed conflict until the peace agreement.
Conflict intensity has been coded on a continuous scale as the share of conflict
years with more than 1000 battle-related deaths compared with the total number
of conflict years. The variablewarring parties captures the number of parties active
in the conflict.5 The variable conflict issue has further been associated with the
durability of peace in various studies and was coded as 0 if the conflict was fought
over territory and 1 if the conflict was fought over government control.
The second group of covariates refers to characteristics of the peace agreements
themselves. Power sharing has been shown to have a significant impact on the
durability of peace (DeRouen et al. 2009; Hartzell andHoddie 2003, 2007; Hartzell
et al. 2001; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009; Mukherjee 2006).
Most peace agreements since 1989 include some provisions for military, political,
and territorial power sharing. We coded power sharing along these three dimen-
sions (military, political, territorial power sharing) and constructed an additive
measure ranging from 0 to 3 depending on the number of power-sharing provi-
sions included in the peace accords. Research has further shown that CPAs tend to
bemore durable because the warring parties enter a prolonged negotiation process
and resolve outstanding issues in several partial agreements that are then ratified in
a final accord (Joshi et al. 2015). Therefore, we also control for CPAs, which is a
binary variable stating whether or not a peace agreement counts as a CPA.We also
control for the inclusion of civil society in the peace negotiations, defined as peace
agreement “provisions specifically addressed at the inclusion of civil society, for
example, through Peace Building Commissions, or through general calls for
inclusion.”6 Data have been coded from the Transitional Justice Peace
4The corresponding Kaplan–Meier plot can be found in the Appendix (Figure A.1). The plot indicates that peace
agreements signed by women resulted in significantly longer periods of peace when compared to peace
agreements not signed by women. The probability of no renewed fighting after 20 years of peace is about
70% if women signed the peace agreement, while it is only about 25% otherwise.
5This variable takes into account rebel groups that ceased to exist, merged, or were newly created during the
conflict period.
6http://www.peaceagreements.ulster.ac.uk/glossary.html.
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Agreement Database, and missing peace agreements were coded according to the
texts available in the UCDP and the UN Peacemaker databases.
Third, the international and domestic environment is likely to affect the
durability of peace. Here, we took into account the presence or absence of a
UN peacekeeping mission.7 This binary variable is coded time-variant.8 We
further controlled for the domestic environment in which women and other
civil society groups operate (Nilsson 2012). Our additional control variable
political rights was coded from the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights
Dataset (2015). We used the variable empowerment rights, which is an
index ranging from 0 to 14. The value 0 indicates that the country does
not respect basic political rights, whilst the value 14 indicates that the country
fully respects these abovementioned rights. In addition to levels of empow-
erment and the international environment, we also control for the level of
democratic development, which has been shown to correlate with the dur-
ability of peace (Fortna 2008: 117). Data for the variable democracy have been
collected from the Political Instability Task Force data set (Marshall, Gurr,
and Jaggers 2016).9 Research has also demonstrated links between gender
inequality and levels of economic development (Hudson et al. 2009). We
used data provided by the World Bank to include the log value of GDP per
capita. Both variables, democracy and GDP per capita, are lagged by 1 year to
avoid endogeneity problems.
We add a number of variables that refer to the level of gender equality and
women’s political influence within a conflict-affected country. Previous stu-
dies have argued that the number of female legislators may also positively
influence the durability of peace (Caprioli et al. 2010: 100; Shair-Rosenfield
and Wood 2017). We control for the percentage of female legislators to
ensure that we do not measure the effect of women’s legislative participation
as the effect of women’s participation in peace negotiations. We combine
data compiled by Paxton, Green, and Hughes (2008), complemented by data
available from the World Bank.10 We can further assume that rebel groups
that include female combatants and women in leadership positions may be
more likely to allow for women’s political participation and generally support
norms of gender equality, which can have an independent effect on the
durability of peace. We therefore control for the numbers of female comba-
tants in rebel groups, using data collected by Thomas and Wood (2017). We
use a categorical indicator ranging from 0 to 3, accounting for the estimated
proportion of an armed group’s combat force that comprises women
7This information is available on the UN website: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/.
8We also included a continuous variable measuring the number of UN troops and police forces in the country. The
data were taken from Kathman (2013). See Table A.2 in Appendix for the results.
9We coded a value lower than 5 as nondemocratic (=0), a value of 5–9 as democratic (=1), and the value 10 as fully
democratic (=2).
10Less than 5% female legislators was coded as 0; thereafter, we coded percentages between 5% and 15% as 1,
15% and 30% as 2, 30% and 50% as 3, and more than 50% as 4.
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(Thomas and Wood 2017: 8).11 Finally, given that leftist insurgency groups
often have much higher numbers of women both among their fighters and
within their political wing and are more likely to support norms of gender
equality and women’s empowerment, we also control for leftist ideology
among rebel groups.12 The variable gender quotas was coded from the
Women and Peace Agreements database.13 The binary variable indicates
whether or not a peace agreement specified a commitment to gender quotas
or particular numbers of women in electoral or other bodies.
We estimate the effect of female signatories on the durability of peace by
employing a Cox proportional hazard model. This decision is justified
because of the less restrictive theoretical assumptions relating to the distribu-
tion of the duration times. Therefore, the Cox model is widely considered
superior to fully parametric models—such as the Weibull or Gompertz
regression. This approach demands that hazards are proportional over time
in order to give valid results. We tested this assumption using Schoenfeld
residuals. If violated, we interacted the covariate in question with the loga-
rithm of analysis time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 132–136). After
doing so, no violations could be found for any of the covariates.
Women’s Participation and the Durability of Peace: Statistical
Analysis and Results
Does direct participation by women in negotiations, as indicated by women
signatories, increase the durability of peace? The results of the statistical
analyses are shown in Table 1. All models control for the main country
and conflict characteristics and each model tests the effect of one additional
variable separately. We limit the models to a maximum of nine covariates to
avoid over-fitting of the model. The demonstrated effect of the independent
variable remains constant even if we control for all covariates in one model
(see model 1 in Table A.1 in Appendix).14
Our models ascertain whether we find a relationship between women signa-
tories and the durability of peace. Our independent variable, female signatories,
has a statistically significant effect at the 0.01 level in all models and reduces the
likelihood of peace failure. As expected, a higher GDP per capita and a higher
level of democratic development consistently impact the durability of peace
positively. Only the inclusion of the variable female legislators neutralizes the
positive effect of a higher GDP per capita. The variables female combatants and
11If no female combatants were present, the variable was coded as 0, in the case of less than 5% as 1, for 5–20% as
2, and if more than 20% were present as 3.
12This information was also taken from the data set provided by Thomas and Wood (2017).
13See http://www.politicalsettlements.org/research/pax-women/.
14The variables female combatants and leftist ideology strongly correlate; we therefore only include the former in
this model. However, our results remain similar if leftist ideology is considered.
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female legislators equally affect peace durability positively and the results are
statistically significant. In model 2, the mentioning of civil society in peace
agreement texts shows a positive impact on peace durability but does not
reach statistical significance.15 None of the further covariates indicates a statis-
tically significant effect on peace duration.
As an additional robustness check, we used a Weibull model (see model 2 in
Table A.1 in Appendix), and our results remain the same. All in all, the
presented statistical analysis finds a robust effect of female signatories on the
durability of peace. The wide range of control variables used in the presented
models limits the risk for spurious correlations. We therefore conclude that the
effect of female signatories on peace durability cannot be reduced to the positive
effect of the percentage of women in parliament, the number of female comba-
tants, adoption of gender quotas, or the general inclusion of civil society.
Selection Bias and Women’s Access to Peace Negotiations
Does the identified correlation betweenwomen signatories and durability of peace
result from selection bias? Are women more likely to receive access to peace
negotiations in conflicts that may be more predisposed to a durable negotiated
settlement? We assess this question by examining the determinants of female
involvement in peace negotiations in more detail (Table 2). Female signatories in
our study include female members of the political wing of armed groups (El
Salvador, Guatemala), female government representatives (Guatemala), and
female civil society activists (UK/Northern Ireland, Papua New Guinea, DR
Congo, Liberia). Thus, women followed different access strategies to the negotia-
tions, making selection bias less likely. All peace agreements except for the DRC
(2003) have been classified as CPAs in the PAM, meaning that they have been
coded as having the major parties to the conflict involved and substantive issues
underlying the disputes included (Joshi et al. 2015). Nevertheless, both variables,
female signatories and CPA, only correlate poorly with each other (Pearson’s
Table 2. Final agreements of peace processes with female signatories.
UNPKO P-IV GDP (log) Fem. L. Fem. C. GQ PR CPA CI LI CS
DR Congo (2003) 1 0 2.24 1 1 1 3 0 1 0 1
El Salvador (1992) 1 1 3.00 1 3 0 10 1 1 1 1
Guatemala (1996) 0 0 3.15 1 2 0 10 1 1 1 1
Liberia (2003) 1 0 2.25 1 3 1 6 1 1 0 1
Papua New Guinea (2001) 0 0 2.80 0 0 1 10 1 0 0 1
UK/N.-Ireland (1998) 0 2 4.43 2 2 0 11 1 0 0 1
Note: P-IV: Democracy; Fem. L.: Female Legislators; Fem. C.: Female Combatants; GQ: Gender Quotas; PR:
Political Rights; CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement; CI: Conflict Issue; LI: Leftist Ideology; CS: Civil
Society.
15In the full model, civil society shows a negative impact on peace durability and reaches statistical significance. We
also tested the effect of civil society on peace durability independently of female signatories for the main model
and the full model. The results remain the same but civil society does not reach statistical significance (see
Table A.3 in Appendix).
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R = .24). In ourmodel, aCPA shows no significant effect on the durability of peace
(see also Joshi et al. 2015). This also holds true if we exclude the female signatories
measure from the models.16 However, we assume that the negotiation structure of
partial accords ratified in one comprehensive accord may offer female delegates
multiple entry points into the negotiation process. For example, in the case of
Guatemala, women did not sign the final accord but partial peace agreements that
were ratified within the final accord.
International mediators may push warring parties to include female delegates,
and internationalized peace agreements may be more likely to have female
signatories. Indeed, for the case of the 2003 DRC peace agreement, international
actors provided significant support and training to female delegates and facilitated
women’s participation. Generally, however, research has also demonstrated that
international mediator involvement does not necessarily result in more durable
peace.17 Consequently, international mediation support in and of itself cannot
account for the correlation between female signatories and peace durability.
Four of the six agreements with female signatories ended conflicts with
high numbers of female combatants. However, only in El Salvador and
Guatemala did female members of rebel groups gain access to the peace
negotiations while in Liberia, it was women civil society groups who gained
entry due to their extensive mobilization.
In sum, no common pattern for the inclusion of female signatories in
peace negotiations can be detected. While we cannot fully exclude the
possibility of selection bias with our relatively small number of peace agree-
ments with female signatories, based on the previous reasoning, we find this
explanation unlikely to fully account for our statistical results.
Women’s Participation and the Quality of Peace: Descriptive Statistics
of Peace Agreement Provisions and Implementation
The second step of our analysis examines whether peace agreements with women
signatories show a high number of agreement provisions, and whether a higher
implementation rate for provisions can be detected. The PAM provides data on
annualized implementation rates for 51 provisions in 34 CPAs negotiated for civil
wars since 1989 (Joshi et al. 2015). Five of our six peace processes with women
signatories—El Salvador (1992), Guatemala (1996), the UK/Northern Ireland
(1998), Papua New Guinea (2001), and Liberia (2003)—are included with a 10-
year implementation rate. Figure 1 demonstrates that along 51 agreement provi-
sion categories, agreements with female signatories include more agreement
provisions for 34 categories, compared to agreements without female signatories.
16See Table A.3 in Appendix.
17See for example Beardsley (2008: 723): “[M]ediation can create artificial incentives that, as the mediator’s
influence wanes and the combatants’ demands change, leave the actors with an agreement less durable than
one that would have been achieved without mediation”.
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In particular, agreements without female signatories included more provisions
with regard to military reform and withdrawal of troops, while agreements with
female signatories included a maximum of provisions with regard to political,
social, and economic reform.
Furthermore, agreements with female signatories also demonstrate a signifi-
cantly higher implementation rate for provisions per category. For only ten
categories do agreements without women signatories show a higher implemen-
tation rate. If we consider peace agreement provisions related to social peace
compared to security-related provisions (Lee,MacGinty and Joshi 2016), we find
% of Accords with Provisions Implementation Rate
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Figure 1. Share of provisions and provisions’ implementation rates for comprehensive peace
agreements with/out female signatories.
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that for most provisions related to social peace, agreements with female signa-
tories include a significantly higher share of provisions than those without
female signatories, and a better implementation rate. Lastly, CPAs with female
signatories show an overwhelmingly better score for the implementation of
women’s rights, providing further evidence that women’s direct participation
increases the durability of peace by reducing gender equality after civil war,
which is a strong predictor of (renewed) armed conflict.18
Figure 2 compares the overall implementation rates for these five comprehen-
sive agreements with the other 29 agreements without female signatories. Overall,
agreements with women signatories scored very high on the implementation rate,
with Guatemala as the agreement with the lowest score still reaching 70%. In
aggregate, agreements with women signatories show a median implementation
rate of 89.3% compared to 76.9% for agreements without them. Three quarters of
all agreements without a female signatory reach an implementation score below
89.3%, while the other six agreements score beyond this point. We can, moreover,
conclude that no agreement with a female signatory has stalled in the implementa-
tion process.
In sum, these numbers on agreement provisions and provision implementation
rates substantiate our argument that women’s direct inclusion in peace negotia-
tions increases the quality and thereby durability of peace. Women networks
Figure 2. Comprehensive peace agreements 10-year implementation rates.
18If we compare these findings on numbers of agreement provisions with data from the UCDP data set (see
Figure A.2 in Appendix), we similarly find that agreements with female signatories show more provisions with
regard to political, social, and economic reform but less provisions with regard to military reform (ceasefires;
integration of rebel groups into the army). However, the data allow for a less comprehensive understanding
because for a significant number of provision categories, very few agreements include provisions, and those
signed by women include none (for example local power-sharing and rebel group integration in civil service).
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support the inclusion and the implementation of provisions that are likely to lead
to political reform and improve women’s status, thereby reducing the risk of
renewed civil war.
The Mechanism: Linkages Between Women Signatories and Women
Civil Society Groups
Lastly, we examine whether female signatories to peace agreements did
indeed maintain linkages to women civil society groups during peace nego-
tiations. Our data set includes 13 partial or full peace agreements signed by
female delegates for peace processes in 6 countries: El Salvador (1992),
Guatemala (1996), the UK/Northern Ireland (1998), Papua New Guinea
(2001), the DRC (2003), and Liberia (2003). In El Salvador, female signa-
tories represented the rebel group Farabundo Martí National Liberation
Front (FMLN). Many women civil society activists had strong ties to the
FMLN and publicly challenged the negotiating parties to incorporate
women’s concerns and demands during the formal peacebuilding process
(St. Germain 1997). During the post-accord negotiations over reintegration
programs, women groups alerted female negotiators to discrimination
against women, and female representatives were able to rectify the situation.
This resulted in the inclusion of female ex-combatants and civilian women in
the reintegration programs, and one-third of the land transfer program
beneficiaries were women (Stephen, Cosgrove and Ready 2000; Conaway
and Martínez 2004).
In Guatemala, two women—Teresa Bolanos de Zarco and Luz Mendez—
were included in the negotiating teams of the rebel group Guatemalan
National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) and the government. Women’s civil
society groups established regular dialogue with Luz Mendez, who acted as a
broker to voice their concerns (UN Women 2012). The peace agreement
included provisions for women’s equal access to land, credit and productive
resources, health care, and education and training (Karam 2000). The colla-
boration between Mendez and civil society groups also supported the per-
ceived legitimacy of the peace talks among wider social networks (Reimann
et al. 2013: 6).
During the UK/Northern Ireland negotiations, female signatories repre-
sented the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition and the government. Female
representatives of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition acted as channels
for bicommunal civil society involvement in the official peacemaking process
and were able to broaden the negotiations to include victim’s rights and
reconciliation (Fearon 2002). Through monthly meetings with the women’s
coalition, female delegates informed a broad network of women about the
development of the negotiations and proposals to be tabled during negotia-
tions. Furthermore, the women’s coalition played a key role in promoting the
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Belfast agreement during the public referendum, thus significantly contribut-
ing to its perceived legitimacy and its implementation (Fearon 1999, 2002).
In Papua New Guinea, Ruby Miringka, the only female delegate, was well
linked to women civil society groups. Women groups advocated for their
distinct agenda, which included broader social developments such as better
communication and transportation services and the inclusion of non-govern-
mental organizations and churches in the rehabilitation programs (Chinkin
2003: 14). Miringka announced the peace agreement to women groups, thus
increasing the perceived legitimacy of the accord. Despite strong links to
women’s civil society groups, however, Miringka had limited impact on the
content of negotiations or the inclusion of provisions for women’s political
participation (Heathcote 2014).
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), women participated in
the 2003 inter-Congolese negotiations as representatives of the parties to the
conflict, political parties, and civil society groups. Female delegates counted
for 9% of all delegates and were trained in a pre-negotiation workshop. In
addition, an expert group of women accompanied the negotiations and
advised on issues such as security sector governance and constitutional law.
Female delegates relied on this expert group for advice and consultation, and
women from both groups formed a women’s caucus as an informal mechan-
ism to ensure that gender equality issues were addressed at the Inter
Congolese Dialogue (Wijeyaratne 2009). The peace agreement text reflected
some of the priorities of the Congolese women active in the peace process,
and the transitional constitution recognized the need for women’s political
participation (Mpoumou 2004).
Lastly, we examine these linkages in more detail for the case of Liberia.
The successful and transformative women’s peace movement in Liberia has
been well documented. During the peace talks in Ghana in 2003, women
from the Mano River Women’s Peace Network took part as official delegates
among civil society delegates. Liberian women from all parts of society were
mobilized by the Liberia section of the Women in Peacebuilding Network
(WIPNET) for a “Mass Action for Peace” around the simple and effective
message: “We Want Peace; No More War.” They called for an immediate
ceasefire and a negotiated settlement, and in their advocacy campaign forged
links to other civil society actors (Barnes 2006). When the peace talks
commenced, women activists sat outside the hall with placards calling for
an end to the violence. WIPNET organized a parallel Women’s Forum to
assess progress in the negotiations and to advocate for issues of importance
to Liberian women and citizens more widely. They met regularly with
delegates from all parties to discuss issues and make recommendations
(Barnes 2006: 44–45). WIPNET fully supported and worked with the Mano
River Women’s Peace Network, whose delegates directly took part in the
negotiations and provided women activists outside the talks with information
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so that they could agitate on the same issues from beyond the negotiating
table (Tripp 2015). When the talks stalled, women barricaded the negotiation
team to enforce renewed negotiations. WIPNET was subsequently asked to
participate in meetings, including those of the political and security commit-
tee. The peace agreement included the formulation that women should be
part of the Governance Reform Commission and that the National
Transitional Legislative Assembly should include members from women’s
organizations (Chinkin and Charlesworth 2006).
After the civil war, women activists drew on skills and networks developed
during the mobilization and peace negotiations to further advocate for
women’s political representation (Adams 2008). WIPNET used its knowledge
of the peace negotiations and organized workshops that explained the con-
tent of the agreement to civil society groups and particularly engaged women
in its implementation. WIPNET also established timelines and benchmarks
to measure progress of the implementation of provisions (Bekoe and Parajon
2007). When the disarmament process stalled, WIPNET members travelled
to disarmament camps and convinced fighters to lay down their arms.
Collaboration between different women civil society groups was also crucial
for the election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to the presidency. She had strong ties
to the women’s movement and had pushed for language on gender equality
in the peace agreement. The linkages between women delegates and civil
society groups outside the talks were also instrumental in mobilizing women
to vote for Johnson-Sirleaf. The strong women’s peace movement was a
precursor to a later mobilization around women’s rights and political
power (Tripp 2015: 113).
In sum, we find evidence that in all cases of successful peace processes
with female signatories, women delegates actively collaborated and built
linkages to women civil society groups. Overall, linkages resulted in networks
that included a diverse range of female political actors and activists, ranging
from former combatants and government representatives to women civil
society activists.
Conclusion
In this article, we have shown that women’s participation in peace negotia-
tions with voice and influence leads to better accord content, higher agree-
ment implementation rates, and longer lasting peace. Our statistical results
show a robust relationship between peace agreements with women signa-
tories and peace durability. This relationship holds after controlling for
conflict characteristics and the level of political and economic development,
UN peacekeeping, the numbers of women in parliament and in rebel groups,
gender quotas, and general civil society inclusion. We further find that peace
agreements signed by women show a significantly higher number of
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agreement provisions and a higher implementation rate of these provisions
than those not signed by women. Previous research has demonstrated that
both accord quality and provision implementation rates emerge as the
strongest predictors of peace durability; women’s direct inclusion with
voice in negotiations improves both accord quality and provision implemen-
tation rates.
However, few women have received direct access to peace negotiations:
between 1989 and 2011, female delegates signed only 13 peace agreements in
6 peace processes. The numbers of female signatories have even decreased
since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Despite the
small number of peace agreements signed by women to date, our results
clearly demonstrate that peace processes are more likely to lead to durable
peace if women have been able to shape them.
We have argued that linkages between female signatories and women civil
society groups explain the positive impact of women’s participation on peace
durability. Linkages between diverse women groups are crucial for informing
the negotiation process and inclusion of provisions that address social
inequalities—and in particular gender inequality. The women networks that
arise from such collaboration during negotiations, and the knowledge and
expertise gained from participating in negotiations, are vital for effective
advocacy of women networks for the implementation of peace agreement
provisions. Strong linkages and collaboration between women signatories
deeply familiar with the negotiation process and its political constellation,
and women civil society groups with local expertise, improve the quality and
the durability of peace after civil war.
These results underline that ensuring women’s right to participation in
peacemaking and peacebuilding cannot be equated with inserting gender-
sensitive language into peace agreement texts. Recent research suggests that it
is often peace agreements with the most holistic references to women that
suffer from chronic implementation failures because these tend to be highly
internationalized accords with little real agreement between the conflict
parties (Bell 2015: 4). Our findings further imply that the policy discourse
on women’s inclusion in peace processes needs to take the diversity of
women groups and potential female delegates into account. Attention has
predominantly focused on including women civil society activists in peace
negotiations (O’Reilly et al. 2015; Reimann 2013). Less attention has been
paid to the potential roles of female combatants, women within the political
wing of an armed group, and female government representatives during
peace negotiations. However, female delegates who signed peace agreements
at times represented the government or rebel group, and not only civil
society. Collaboration between women delegates and women civil society
groups broadens the civilian support base for peace and results in networks
that can persistently advocate for the adoption of policies that empower
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women. More research is needed into the dynamics of women networks,
knowledge building, and policymaking during peace processes. Future
research should examine in more detail the quality of civil society access
and involvement in peace negotiations and its impact on the durability of
peace. We conclude that including women directly in peace negotiations with
voice is not only a matter of justice but also of effectiveness, quality, and
sustainability of peace.
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Figure A.1. Survival Estimates for Peace Agreements with/without Female Signatories.
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Figure A.2. Share of Accords in Peace Agreements (UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset).
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Table A.1. Women Signatories and Peace Durability, Full Model and Weibull Model.
(1) (2)
Full Model Weibull
F. Signatories 0.020*** 0.032***
(-3.751) (-3.788)
C. Duration 1.097*** 1.100***
(3.563) (3.855)
C. Intensity 1.061 0.767
(0.0702) (-0.286)
Warring Parties 0.840** 0.843**
(-2.451) (-2.221)
Power sharing 1.063 1.042
(0.165) (0.117)
Democracy 0.069*** 0.091***
(-3.607) (-3.747)
GDP (log) 0.032** 0.059**
(-2.332) (-2.486)
Political Rights 0.800 0.819
(-1.600) (-1.445)
CPA 0.508 0.353*
(-1.464) (-1.952)
C. Issue 0.374 0.726
(-1.426) (-0.483)
UNPKO 0.091* 0.766
(-1.655) (-0.504)
F. Legislators 0.652** 0.538***
(-2.054) (-2.821)
F. Combatants 0.377** 0.389**
(-2.335) (-2.360)
Quotas 0.175 0.125*
(-1.457) (-1.648)
Civil Society 3.489* 3.477**
(1.919) (2.000)
UNPKO x ln(t) 1.459
(1.549)
Constant 43.95
(1.006)
Observations 318 318
Number of Subjects 54 54
Log likelihood -75.842 -63.715
Note: The first model shows a Cox proportional hazards model. Hazard ratios rather than coefficients are
reported, with t statistics given in parentheses. The right column shows the results of a Weibull model.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, clustered in conflict.
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Table A.2. Women Signatories and Peace Durability, Model with UN
Troops.
Model
F. Signatories 0.055***
(-5.300)
C. Duration 1.041*
(1.928)
C. Intensity 0.522
(-0.691)
Warring Parties 0.978
(-0.626)
Power sharing 1.201
(0.604)
Democracy 0.308**
(-2.252)
GDP (log) 0.292**
(-2.036)
Political Rights 0.897
(-1.113)
UN Troops 0.999***
(-3.279)
UN Troops x ln(t) 1.000***
(3.677)
Observations 406
Number of Subjects 67
Log likelihood -130.310
F. Signatories 0.055***
Note: A Cox proportional hazards model was employed. Hazard ratios rather
than coefficients are reported, with t statistics given in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, clustered in conflict.
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Table A.3. Robustness: The Impact of Civil Society without Female Signatories.
(1) (2)
Main Model Full Model
C. Duration 1.022 1.130***
(1.076) (3.697)
C. Intensity 0.730 2.325
(-0.328) (0.941)
Warring Parties 1.021 0.717***
(0.542) (-3.563)
Power sharing 0.954 0.999
(-0.163) (-0.00219)
Democracy 0.409 0.301**
(-1.603) (-1.983)
GDP (log) 0.376 0.0814**
(-1.641) (-2.248)
Political Rights 0.888 0.807*
(-1.546) (-1.852)
CPA 0.590
(-1.297)
C. Issue 0.867
(-0.194)
UNPKO 0.132*
(-1.769)
F. Legislators 0.710*
(-1.699)
F. Combatants 0.524*
(-1.939)
Quotas 0.351
(-1.053)
Civil Society 0.610 1.359
(-1.249) (0.486)
C. Duration x ln(t) 0.984***
(-2.614)
Warring Parties x ln(t) 1.052***
(3.532)
UNPKO x ln(t) 1.255
(1.116)
Observations 406 338
Number of Subjects 67 58
Log likelihood -137.958 -101.906
Note: A Cox proportional hazards model was employed. Hazard ratios rather than coefficients are reported,
with t statistics given in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, clustered in conflict.
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